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Abstract
All differences between the role of space and time in nature are explained by propos-
ing the principles in which none of the space-time coordinates has an a priori special
role. Spacetime is treated as a nondynamical manifold, with a fixed global RD topol-
ogy. Dynamical theory of gravity determines only the metric tensor on a fixed manifold.
All dynamics is treated as a Cauchy problem, so it follows that one coordinate takes a
special role. It is proposed that any boundary condition that is finite everywhere leads
to a solution which is also finite everywhere. This explains the (1,D − 1) signature
of the metric, the boundedness of energy from below, the absence of tachyons, and
other related properties of nature. The time arrow is explained by proposing that the
boundary condition should be ordered. The quantization is considered as a boundary
condition for field operators. Only the physical degrees of freedom are quantized.
1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental principles of today’s theoretical physics is the principle of
Lorentz covariance. This principle essentialy says that all fundamental physical theories
should treat space and time coordinates in the same way, up to a negative relative sign in
the metric of spacetime. However, it is known that space and time coordinates are not really
treated in the same way, and that these different treatments cannot be explained only from
the negative relative sign in the metric. One has to introduce some additional principles in
order to explain and describe the observed different roles of space and time in nature. Let us
make a list of some very known principles and observational facts that explicitly state that
space and time should be treated in different ways:
– There are a few space coordinates, but there is precisely one time coordinate.
– There is a time arrow, but there is nothing like a space arrow.
– Psychologically, we experience time and space in completely different ways; we remem-
ber the past and not the future, which refers to time, not to space.
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– We can travel in space in all directions, but we cannot do that in time.
– The entropy grows with time, but not with space.
– There is a causality principle, which refers to time, not to space; in classical electro-
dynamics, one uses only retarded solutions and disregards advanced solutions, which again
refers to the sign of time, not that of space.
– The separation of causally connected events should be timelike or lightlike, but cannot
be spacelike; the 4-momentum of a physical particle should be timelike or lightlike, but
cannot be spacelike.
– Time has a special role in the canonical (i.e., Hamiltonian) formalism; in field theory
(of real scalar fields, for simplicity), the set of all degrees of freedom is given by all space
points x, not by all space-time points (x, t); in order to quantize fields, we propose equal-
time (anti)commutators, not equal-space (anti)commutators; field operators (anti)commute
for spacelike separations, not for timelike separations.
– The time component of the 4-momentum (energy) must be positive (or zero), while
the space components of the 4-momentum can have both signs; the quantum operator of the
space inversion is unitary, while the quantum operator of the time inversion is antiunitary.
– In the quantum theory of particles (i.e., first quantization) there is an xˆ-operator, but
there is no tˆ-operator.
If one believes that the fundamental laws of nature should possess a certain simplicity
and symmetry, then it is reasonable to believe that the fundamental laws should have such
a form that none of the space-time coordinates has an a priori special role. If this is so,
none of the itemized laws can be fundamental. From some more fundamental laws it should
rather follow that one of the coordinates must take a special role, by a mechanism which can
be viewed as some kind of spontaneous symmetry breaking.
The idea that the different roles of space and time are consequences of spontaneous
symmetry breaking is not new. In [1, 2, 3] the possibility is considered that this is achieved via
the Higgs mechanism. The aim of this article is to give a proposal for a different mechanism
which gives different roles to space and time, a mechanism which does not require the
introduction of the Higgs field.
It is a tradition among almost all physicists that only finding the correct equations
of motion is regarded as a really fundamental task, while the question of the boundary
conditions is regarded as a secondary problem. Here I leave such a viewpoint. I consider
the question of the boundary conditions as an equally fundamental question as the question
of the equations of motion themselves. Therefore, I postulate some principles which the
boundary condition of the Universe should obey. These principles I choose in such a way
that none of space-time coordinates has an a priori special role, but they can still explain
the known differences of the role of space and time in the Universe.
The difference between space and time emerges from the viewpoint that nature must
choose some (D− 1)-dimensional submanifold on which the boundary condition will be im-
posed. This automatically gives a special status to one particular coordinate, the coordinate
which is constant on this submanifold. This is the mechanism of spontaneous symmetry
breaking in my approach. I propose essentially three additional principles. First, spacetime
is a nondynamical manifold, with a fixed global RD topology. Dynamical theory of gravity
determines only the metric tensor on it. Second, I propose that any boundary condition
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which is finite everywhere leads to the solution which is also finite everywhere. This ex-
plains the hyperbolicity, i.e., (1, D − 1) signature of the metric. (It is interesting to note
that there is an attempt to explain the hyperbolicity by certain anthropic arguments [4].
My approach is based on the same mathematical properties of hyperbolic and nonhyper-
bolic equations exploited in this work, but I choose different arguments to favor hyperbolic
equations only.) This second principle also explains the boundedness of energy from below,
the absence of tachyons, and other related properties of nature. The third principle states
that the boundary condition is ordered, rather than random. It explains the time arrow.
The quantization is considered as a boundary condition for the field operators. Only phys-
ical degrees of freedom are quantized. This, together with the treatment of spacetime as
a nondynamical background, resolves the problem of time in quantum gravity, at least at
the conceptual level. Possible paradoxes connected with the possibility of time travel are
excluded by my choice of topology.
In Section 2 I present the main physical and mathematical ideas which led me to find
the principles which can describe the nature of space and time and explain the differences
between them. In Section 3 I give a precise formulation of these principles, as a set of
axioms which classical physics should obey. The purpose of Section 4 is to discuss in more
detail the origin of various differences between the role of space and time in classical physics,
emphasizing that they all emerge from the axioms of Section 3. In Section 5 I discuss
the origin of the difference between the role of space and time in quantum physics. The
connection with classical physics is the most manifest in the Heisenberg picture, which I use
to formulate the quantization as a boundary condition for field operators. In Section 6 I
discuss whether the second principle that I propose is satisfied for our theories and what
new consequences can emerge from this principle. In Section 7 I discuss whether some of my
axioms can be rejected or weakened. In addition, I make some remarks on the question of
dimensionality of space. Section 8 is devoted to concluding remarks.
2 The main ideas
In this section I give the main physical and mathematical ideas which led me to find the
principles proposed in Section 3. Section 2 is intended to be very pedagogical, but not too
exhaustive. It is also intended to be intuitive, rather than rigorous.
Let us start from the origin of the time arrow. Most of physicists agree that all manifes-
tations of the time arrow (except the arrow connected with the direction of the expansion
of the Universe) are consequences of the thermodynamic time arrow, i.e., of the fact that
disorder increases with time. A clear explanation of how the causal, psychological, and elec-
trodynamic time arrows emerge from the assumption that disorder increases with time is
given in [5]. The fact that disorder grows with time is equivalent to the statement that the
Universe was quite ordered in the past. Thus, the only real problem with the time arrow is
to explain why the Universe was so ordered at some instant of time of its evolution. Since
I cannot find any convincing explanation of this (except the anthropic principle [6]), I shall
take this as one of my fundamental postulates. It is enough to postulate that at some “ini-
tial” instant of time (not necessarily to be the earliest instant) all fields and matter must be
in some partially ordered configuration in all space regions, but in such a way that “initial”
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velocities have random space-directions. I require random directions of velocities because
then both time directions are equivalent, in the sense that disorder increases in both direc-
tions from this “initial” instant. The present velocities are obviously not random, since they
lead to the increasing order in the negative time direction. The “initial” instant is actually
the instant of minimal entropy.
The next question considered is why is time the coordinate which takes a special role?
Why is this is not the z-coordinate, for example? Or why is there no more than one coordi-
nate which takes the role similar to that of time? The answer to this question can be easily
found if one treats the dynamics of the Universe as a Cauchy problem. To solve a partial
differential equation in D dimensions, one first needs to fix some (D − 1)-dimensional sub-
manifold (Cauchy surface) on which the Cauchy data will be imposed. This automatically
gives a special status to one particular coordinate, the coordinate which is constant on this
submanifold. If we, in addition, require that the differential equation should provide a stable
evolution of the Cauchy data, then for a second-order differential equation two necessary
conditions must be fulfilled [4]: First, the equation must be hyperbolic, which corresponds
to the (1, D− 1) signature of the metric. Second, the Cauchy surface must be spacelike, i.e.,
the boundary condition must be the initial condition.
Let us illustrate this on a free-field equation
∂µ∂
µφ(x) +m2φ(x) = 0 . (1)
All known free fields satisfy this equation, including the Dirac field too. We assume that
the metric has the form gµν = diag(1,−1,−1,−1). m2 is some real parameter that can be
positive, zero, or negative. If we are looking for the solution of the form φ(x) = exp(ik · x),
we find the dispersion relation
k20 − k2 = m2 . (2)
In general, any component of k can be complex. However, if we require that the solution
is finite for any value of x, including the cases when some of the components of x is ±∞,
we conclude that all components of k must be real. Now let us suppose that m2 > 0. In
this case, the real vector k can be arbitrary, since then k0 is also real. However, k0 cannot
take an arbitrary real value, but must rather satisfy k20 ≥ m2. We can construct the general
solution of (1) which is finite everywhere as a Fourier expansion over plane-wave solutions.
For some fixed t, it can have an arbitrary (finite everywhere) dependence on x. However,
for fixed z, for example, it cannot have an arbitrary time-dependence, because the spectrum
of k0 is truncated. Therefore, if we require that the arbitrary boundary condition that is
finite everywhere leads to the solution which is also finite everywhere, then the boundary
condition must be the initial condition.
Using a similar argument one can also see that m2 cannot be negative, because otherwise,
owing to the fact that there is more than one space coordinate, no 3 components of k could
take arbitrary real values, without leading to the imaginary fourth component of k.
One can also easily generalize the analysis to the flat metric with the (n,m) signature,
and conclude that the arbitrary boundary condition that is everywhere finite can lead to the
solution which is also finite everywhere only if n or m is equal to 1.
Now we can already see the main idea why one coordinate, so-called time, takes a special
role. The dynamics is described by some partial differential equations in D dimensions that
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treat all coordinates in the same way, up to some signs in the metric, which can generally take
the (n,m) signature (n+m = D). Thus the differential equations are covariant with respect
to the SO(n,m) group of coordinate transformations. However, the differential equations
do not describe the dynamics uniquely; one must also fix some boundary condition. To do
that, one first must fix the boundary itself, which is some (D− 1)-dimensional submanifold.
This defines the remaining one coordinate which has the same value at the whole (D − 1)-
dimensional subspace. By imposing that the arbitrary finite everywhere boundary condition
leads to a solution which is also finite everywhere, we obtain that all coordinates on this
boundary must have the same sign of the metric and that the remaining one coordinate
must have the opposite sign of the metric. Thus we derive the Lorentz invariance SO(1, D−
1) (isomorphic to SO(D − 1, 1)). This also leads to some constraints on the form of the
differential equations, including the sign of m2. In addition, we impose that the boundary
condition must be ordered in a described sense, from which we derive the second law of
thermodynamics and thus the causal role of the time coordinate.
I also want to clarify some conceptual details that are important for a deeper under-
standing of gravity. Physicists are used to think that there is a great difference between the
gravitational field and all other fields, because other fields describe some dynamics for which
spacetime serves as a background, while the gravity field describes the dynamics of space-
time itself. So, they often imagine that spacetime itself cannot exist without the existence
of the gravity field gµν(x), whereas it can exist without other fields (which corresponds to
Tµν = 0 in the Einstein equation). However, a manifold with coordinates x
µ can be well
defined even without the metric being defined. This leads to the possibility of interpreting
the gravitational field in such a way that it differs much less from the other fields. Such an
interpretation could be useful in order to formulate a consistent theory of quantum gravity.
When solving the Einstein equation, one can forget that gµν(x) represents the metric
tensor; it can be viewed just as some second-rank tensor field. Moreover, solving the Ein-
stein equation as a Cauchy problem requires that the topology of spacetime should be fixed
before the actual solving. More precisely, the Cauchy problem is well posed only if the
topology takes the form Σ ×R on the global level, where Σ represents the topology of the
Cauchy surface. (Note that, in practice, the Einstein equation is usually not solved as a
Cauchy problem; it is solved by imposing some symmetry conditions of the metric on the
whole spacetime. The various solutions satisfying these conditions are then recognized as
representing various topologies.) In this article I propose that the whole dynamics should be
treated as a Cauchy problem, so I propose that the topology of spacetime is not a dynamical
entity. Since I require that none of space-time coordinates should have an a priori special
role, the topology should also be symmetrical in that sense. Therefore, I choose RD as a
global topology. Note finally that the condition D = 4, as well as the (1,3) signature of the
metric, must also be imposed by the initial condition in the Cauchy-problem approach to
the Einstein equation.
3 The formulation of principles
In this section the precise formulation of principles that I propose is given as a set of axioms.
These axioms refer mainly to classical physics, while the transition to quantum physics is
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discussed in Section 5.
Axiom 1 There exists a manifold M which can be globally bijectively mapped to the set
RD, where D is a fixed positive integer.
This axiom says that spacetime is continuous, D-dimensional, infinite, and predynamical.
The mapping in Axiom 1 defines the coordinates x ≡ {x1, . . . , xD} ∈ RD. Next we introduce
a metric tensor on M which is a symmetric second-rank tensor which must satisfy the
following axiom.
Axiom 2 For each point x there exists a neighborhood U , non-negative integers n, m sat-
isfying n+m = D, and coordinates, such that the metric tensor possesses n positive and m
negative eigenvalues on U .
This axiom says that for each point there exist numbers n,m and coordinates such that the
metric is invariant with respect to SO(n,m) coordinate transformations at this point. This
is a generalization of the Lorentz SO(1, 3) invariance. It is also important to note that from
Axiom 2 it follows that the metric possesses the global decomposition into D = n +m, i.e.,
if, for example, the manifold M has the (1,3) signature of the metric at some point, then it
has the same signature on the whole M.
Now we introduce dynamics, described by some fields ϕa(x). The metric tensor can also
be one of dynamical fields, but this is not necessary. For dynamical fields we require the
following axiom:
Axiom 3 Dynamical fields satisfy partial differential equations (with derivatives with respect
to xµ) and for each point x there exist coordinates such that the equations are covariant with
respect to SO(n,m) coordinate transformations at this point, where n,m are determined by
Axiom 2.
To construct such differential equations, we do not usually have to worry about the precise
values of n and m, since these equations look formally the same for various n,m when
written in a manifestly covariant form. Use of Lagrangian techniques further simplifies the
construction of such equations.
The knowledge of the differential equations does not determine dynamical fields uniquely.
We want to understand the principles which nature obeys in order to pick up a particular
solution that corresponds to the actual Universe. Now the essence of my philosophy is as
follows: It is redundant for nature to choose some differential equations and some particular
solution. Nature actually chooses some differential equations and some boundary condition.
The crucial point is that nature must first choose some (D − 1)-dimensional submanifold
MB ⊂ M on which the boundary condition will be imposed, so nature really does choose
it. This choice is not considered as a mathematical convenience, but rather as a real event
in nature. Such a viewpoint can look slightly metaphysical, but we shall see that such a
viewpoint leads to a natural explanation of the known differences between the roles of space
and time, as well as to some new predictions. Furthermore, we shall see that, for a given
universe, this “canonical” submanifold MB can be uniquely identified, at least in principle.
In the following I propose some axioms that refer to the properties of this “canonical” MB
and the corresponding boundary condition, which nature should obey.
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If the differential equations are of the k-th order in the field ϕa(x), then it is convenient
to choose some connected boundary MB and to fix ϕa(x) and all its normal derivatives on
it, up to the (k − 1)-th derivative. If this is done for all fields appearing in the differen-
tial equations, the Cauchy-Kowalevska theorem provides that the solution is then unique.
(Strictly speaking, this theorem also requires the analyticity of the boundary condition and
provides the analyticity of the solution. However, we shall assume that the Cauchy problem
is well posed also for smooth enough boundary conditions which are not necessarily analytic).
Usually, some different forms of boundary conditions also lead to the unique solution; for
example, one can choose k − 1 connected manifolds which are mutually disconnected and
fix on them only the fields ϕa(x), not its normal derivatives. However, there are cases when
such forms of boundary conditions do not lead to the unique solution. Therefore, I propose
the following axiom:
Axiom 4 The boundary MB is a connected (D− 1)-dimensional submanifold which can be
globally bijectively mapped to the set RD−1.
It is understood that the boundary condition fixes the fields ϕa(x) and all its normal deriva-
tives up to the (k−1)-th derivative. Thus, because of Axiom 1, the topology ofMB proposed
in Axiom 4 is the only one that can lead to a well-posed boundary-condition problem.
Let us now introduce the following definition:
Definition 1 A function ϕ : X → C is regular on a domain X ⊆M if |ϕ(x)| is bounded
from above for every x ∈ X.
In other words, a regular function is a function which is finite everywhere. It is quite
reasonable to require that physical fields should be regular. However, it is known that some
fields, such as the metric tensor gµν , the connection Γ
ρ
µν , and the vector potential Aµ do not
have to be regular. I shall refer to such fields as gauge fields. Only physical fields, such as
the scalar curvature R and the field strength Fµν have to be regular, whereas the gauge fields
can possess only such irregularities which do not lead to irregularities of the corresponding
physical fields. Having this in mind, I introduce the following definition:
Definition 2 The field ϕa is essentially regular on X if its corresponding physical field
is regular on X. The metric field is essentially regular on X if it is essentially regular as a
field and satisfies Axiom 2 on X.
I have no intention to give a rigorous definition of a physical field. Let me just note that
fields appearing in the Lagrangians which do not possess any kind of gauge symmetry are
its own physical fields.
Now we are ready to propose the following axioms:
Axiom 5 For a given signature of the metric there exists MB such that every boundary
condition essentially regular on MB leads to the solution essentially regular on M.
Axiom 6 The Cauchy surface MB is chosen in such a way as to satisfy the requirement of
Axiom 5. The boundary condition is essentially regular on MB.
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Axiom 5 is central and the most important axiom of this article. This is actually not the
constraint on the boundary condition, but rather on the signature and on the possible forms
of the dynamics, i.e., on the possible equations of motion. As we shall see, this Axiom
explains the hyperbolicity of the equations of motion, i.e., the (1, D − 1) signature of the
metric. It also explains a lot of known differences between the role of space and time itemized
in the Introduction. Finally, it leads to some new predictions. All that will be discussed in
later sections. Here I want to explain that axioms of this section lead to a new philosophy
of the logical (not temporal) order which nature must follow when it chooses the conditions
which uniquely determine the Universe.
Nature first chooses the dimension D of the manifoldM, according to Axiom 1. Then it
chooses the signature (n,m) according to Axiom 5. After that it chooses MB according to
Axiom 6. The next step is to choose a set of fields {ϕa} which will describe the dynamics,
making a difference between the physical and the gauge fields, but not yet specifying its
specific dependence on x. The very next step, the central one in my philosophy, is to choose
the differential equations (or Lagrangian) which will provide that any essentially regular
boundary condition will lead to an essentially regular solution, according to Axiom 5. Of
course, these differential equations must also satisfy some additional principles, such as
covariance (Axiom 3) and probably some other principles, which are not important here. At
the end it only remains to choose some particular boundary condition onMB, according to
Axiom 6, which then uniquely determines the Universe.
The six axioms, proposed so far, still cannot explain all the differences between the role
of space and time itemized in the Introduction. We need one additional axiom which will
provide that disorder increases with time and thus explains the time arrow. This axiom must
essentially say that the boundary condition is not completely random, but rather ordered
somehow, as discussed in Section 2. It is not easy to formulate this axiom in a mathematically
rigorous way. Thus I formulate this in a way which is not very rigorous, but rather intuitive:
Axiom 7 The boundary condition on MB is partially ordered, rather than random. In
particular, absolute values of various fields are not homogeneous, but rather lumped in lo-
calized lumps. However, the field derivatives in the normal direction to MB, needed for the
uniqueness of the solution of the Cauchy problem, are random.
The last sentence in Axiom 7 corresponds to the assumption that the initial velocities are
random, which provides that disorder increases in both time directions from the so-called
initial hypersurface MB, so both time directions are equivalent.
4 The differences between space and time in classical
physics
In this section I discuss how all the differences between the role of space and time in classical
physics emerge from the axioms of Section 3. However, it is important to note that the most
of the discussion is valid even if novel principles of this article are not realized in nature. Only
Axioms 1 and 5 are really novel principles, in the sense that they differ from the conventional
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point of view and can be tested, at least in principle. In order to provide a complete and
clear picture, I find it necessary to review some already known results.
If dynamical fields satisfy second-order differential equations, then it follows from Axioms
3 and 5 that the differential equations must be hyperbolic, i.e., the signature of the metric
must be (1, D − 1) (see, for example, [4] and references therein). We shall see in Section 6
that Axiom 5 also explains why dynamical fields are not described by differential equations
of order higher than second.
In order to satisfy Axiom 5, the hyperbolicity is necessary, but not sufficient. For free
fields, for example, we have seen in Section 2 that m2 cannot be negative. The fact that
m2 cannot be negative explains why the D-momentum of a free physical particle cannot be
spacelike. If we assume that the propagation velocity of a free wave packet is given by the
so-called group velocity
vg =
dω
dk
, (3)
where ω =
√
k2 +m2, then we see that there are no velocities greater than c ≡ 1, which
then explains why the separation of causally connected events cannot be spacelike, at least
for the free case.
However, it is fair to mention that the propagation velocity of a free wave packet is not
always given by (3). Thus it is not strange that there are solutions of all known free relativistic
wave equations (such as free Klein-Gordon, Maxwell, and Dirac equations) which propagate
with superluminal velocities, i.e., velocities that are greater than c [8]. However, there are
no real paradoxes with these solutions because it appears that the corresponding physical
quantities (such as the Poynting vector for the electromagnetic field) do not propagate faster
than c. Thus the principle that no energy or information can propagate faster than c is not
violated, and this is what we understand when we claim that fields do not propagate faster
than c.
The requirement thatm2 ≥ 0, which was obtained for free fields, in the case of interacting
fields generalizes to the requirement that the energy should be bounded from below. To see
this, we consider the Lagrangian for the real scalar field φ(x):
L = 1
2
∂µφ∂
µφ− V (φ) , (4)
where
V (φ) = −µ
2
2
φ2 +
λ
4
φ4 . (5)
The parameters µ2 and λ are real constants. The corresponding equation of motion can be
written in the form
∂µ∂
µφ(x) +m2eff(x)φ(x) = 0 , (6)
where
m2eff(x) = −µ2 + λφ2(x) . (7)
If we require the stable time evolution, and if λ 6= 0, then for a large φ2(x) the relation
m2eff(x) ≥ 0 must be fulfilled [9]. This means that the relation λ > 0 must be fulfilled, which
is actually the consequence of Axiom 5, because the stability requirement is essentially the
same requirement as Axiom 5.
9
Let us now see what it has to do with the sign of energy. We introduce the canonical
energy-momentum tensor
Θµν =
∂L
∂(∂µφ)
∂νφ− gµνL . (8)
The corresponding energy-density for the Lagrangian (4) is
H = Θ00 = Θ00 =
[
φ˙2
2
+
(∇φ)2
2
]
+ V (φ) . (9)
The term in the square bracket represents the kinetic part of Θ00. We see that it has the
definite (positive) sign. It is easy to see that owing to the (1, D− 1) signature of the metric,
no other component of Θµν or Θ
µν has definite sign of its kinetic part for D > 2. Since λ > 0,
we see that V (φ) is bounded from below. Thus we see that the boundedness of the energy
from below is actually the consequence of Axiom 5 (i.e., the stability requirement). A similar
connection between Axiom 5 and the boundedness of the energy from below can be seen in
a similar way for most of other Lagrangians. The positivity of energy is then obtained from
the appropriate energy shift, which does not change the physical laws (except gravity, at
least in the conventional approach).
We see that if E is some admissible energy, then −E may not be admissible energy. The
consequence of this is that energy does not transform as a time component of a D-vector
with respect to time inversion.
Let us discuss now the consequences of Axiom 7. (In the following I use the term “disor-
der” rather than “entropy”, because the former is a more general concept, while the latter
corresponds to some particular measure of disorder, which can be inappropriate for some
purposes). According to this axiom, the so-called initial state of the Universe is quite or-
dered. We assume that the degree of orderliness is homogeneous on the initial spacelike
manifold MB. This manifold defines the natural foliation of spacetime into the class of
spacelike manifolds Σ(t), with the property Σ(0) = MB. We choose t in such a way that
the orderliness is homogeneous (at least at some large scale) on the whole Σ for any fixed t.
Disorder increases in both time directions from t = 0, so there is no a special time direction.
Tha causal, psychological, and electrodynamic time arrows are consequences of the disorder
increase [5]. The positive time direction is defined as a direction from MB to the present
time. Thus t defines the natural cosmological time, but still not uniquely, because t can be
replaced by some h(t), where h is some strictly increasing function, satisfying h(0) = 0. In
order to define the time coordinate uniquely, we can require gtt = 1. For a given universe,
MB can be uniquely identified as a (D−1)-dimensional spacelike manifold Σ with the small-
est measure of disorder (entropy). The instant t = 0 can be considered as the instant of the
“creation” of the Universe (whatever this means) by some yet unknown mechanism.
According to Axiom 7, the fields are initially lumped. Since fields cannot propagate faster
than c, no part of the boundary of a D-dimensional lump cannot be spacelike. Therefore,
from the covariant conservation laws of the form
∂µJ
µ = ∂tJ
0 +∇J = 0 , (10)
it follows that various quantities are conserved in time, but not in space:
d
dt
∫
V
dD−1x J0(x, t) = 0 . (11)
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Let us now consider the question why we cannot travel in time. This question can
be answered from several points of view, corresponding to slightly different definitions of
the notion of time travel. First, one can argue that a time traveler can observe that he
arrived at the past only if he remembers the future, which is extremely improbable [5]. The
second approach is based on the consideration of the difference between space and time
travel. The fact that material objects can travel in both space directions but only in one
time direction can be stated rigorously as: The trajectory of a material object x(t) is a
single-valued function, whereas its inverse t(x) is not necessarily a single-valued function.
To clarify this, let us consider a 1 + 1 dimensional example of a trajectory which would
correspond to the time travel in that sense: t(x) = −x2. This can be viewed as an object
traveling first in the positive time direction, but at t = 0 it starts to travel in the negative
time direction. However, this is how it really would look like for an independent observer:
Two identical objects (which is rather improbable by itself if these are not two elementary
particles) approach each other, they finally collide at t = 0 and then disappear for t > 0, thus
violating the conservation laws. In other words, objects can travel in both space directions,
but only in one time direction because they are localized in space and thus conserved in
time.
The third approach to the time travel, based on the possibility that the Universe can
possess topology or a metric tensor which admits closed timelike curves, is the subject of
many current theoretical investigations. One of the most important contributions against the
time travel is given in [10], where it is argued that various conditions (topological defects and
metric tensors which do not possess the (1, D− 1) signature everywhere) needed for various
mechanisms of time travel cannot be realized in practice, essentially because their realizations
require infinite energy. However, in my opinion, the strongest argument against the time
travel, discussed also in [10] and particularly clearly in [11], is the consistency requirement:
for any space-time point x, all physical fields ϕa(x) must be uniquely determined. The
consistency in the Cauchy-problem approach is automatically provided by Axioms 1 and
4. The time travel based on metric tensors which do not possess the (1, D − 1) signature
everywhere is also excluded by Axiom 2. In [10] it is also shortly discussed the possibility of
time travel if it is possible to travel in space faster than light, but we have already excluded
the possibility of traveling faster then light.
Now a few notes on the different roles of time and space in the Hamiltonian formalism.
Historically, the Hamiltonian formalism was first developed for pointlike particles, i.e., for
the objects which are strictly localized in space and exist for all times. This is the difference
between the role of space and time already at the kinematical level. Thus, it is not strange
that particle mechanics has a formulation, such as the Hamiltonian formalism, which treats
space and time in different ways.
However, such an argument cannot be directly applied to field theories. The Hamiltonian
formulation of them was probably partly influenced by our intuitive notion of time, which is
the consequence of the time arrow, leading to the intuitive picture that dynamics is something
that changes with time. This leads to the notion of “degree of freedom” as a real variable
which can (at the kinematical level) possess arbitrary dependence on time. Thus, the set of
all degrees of freedom of a real scalar field is given by all space points x, not by all space-time
points (x, t). Dynamics, i.e., an equation of motion, is something that determines the actual
time dependence. In the Hamiltonian approach to field theory, dynamics is given by the
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Hamiltonian density H = H(φ(x), pi(x)). The Poisson brackets among functions of φ(x) and
pi(x) are actually equal-time Poisson brackets [12]. They can be viewed as Poisson brackets
among initial conditions. Thus, the phase space is space of all initial conditions. In the spirit
of the axioms of Section 3, it is most natural to consider the degrees of freedom as variables
which can be arbitrarily chosen on MB (except that they must be essentially regular and
ordered). Such a viewpoint will be exploited for the formulation of the canonical quantum
theory.
I want to emphasize that the canonical formalism in classical field theory is only a conve-
nience of calculation. Nothing is really lost if one does not at all introduce Hamiltonians and
Poisson brackets, but rather uses only Lagrangians and corresponding manifestly covariant
equations of motion. The existence of the Hamiltonian formalism in classical field theory
still does not mean that space and time take different roles. For example, one could also
formulate a variant of the canonical formalism in which the x1 coordinate takes a special
role, by introducing the Legendre transformation
H(1) = pi(1)(x)∂φ(x)
∂x1
−L , (12)
where
pi(1)(x) =
∂L
∂(∂1φ(x))
. (13)
(Note that (12) is equal to Θ11 in (8)). In particular, this would lead to a new kind of Poisson
brackets which would be interpreted as equal-x1 Poisson brackets.
At the end of this section let me give a few notes on theories with constraints. The
constraints appear in the Lagrangians which are invariant with respect to some local gauge
transformations [13]. For such systems, some of the equations of motion are interpreted as
constraint equations, which can be understood as constraints to the initial condition. Thus
the initial condition is not arbitrary, i.e., the number of fields which can be arbitrarily fixed
on the initial Cauchy surface is smaller than it seems at first sight. Axiom 5 refers to these
physical degrees of freedom, which are actually the fields for which the initial condition can
be arbitrarily chosen (this refers to their initial time derivatives too), whereas the initial
values of other fields are determined via the constraint equations. In order to provide a well-
posed Cauchy problem, some additional gauge conditions must be chosen before determining
the time evolution.
5 The differences between space and time in quantum
physics
In this section I discuss the origin of the differences between space and time in quantum
physics. The connection with classical physics is the most manifest in the Heisenberg picture,
which I use to formulate the quantization as a boundary condition for field operators. As in
Section 4, for the sake of completeness and clarity, I also review some already known results.
The main new idea of this section is a suggestion that quantum physics cannot remove, in
a satisfactory way, singularities of the corresponding classical theory, so we need to modify
the classical theory in order to remove the singularities.
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The Heisenberg-picture quantization is based on equal-time commutators among canon-
ical coordinates and conjugated momenta, which gives different roles to time and space.
One could wonder whether we can use the equal-space Poisson brackets resulting from the
formalism based on (12) to propose the corresponding equal-space commutation relations,
without changing the physical content of the resulting theory. The answer is no, owing to
the fact that the Poisson brackets are defined to be what they are, while the corresponding
commutation relations are postulated. In other words, introduction of the Poisson brackets
does not change the physics, while introduction of the commutation relations does change
the physics. Thus the difference between space and time in quantum physics is even deeper
than in classical physics.
Let me stress some other important facts about the Heisenberg-picture quantization. The
“general” solution of the equation of motion for a free real scalar field, which is usually used,
is
φ(x) =
∫
dD−1k
(2pi)D−12ω
[a(k)e−ik·x + a†(k)eik·x] , (14)
where ω =
√
k2 +m2, and integration is performed over all real vectors k. Let us emphasize
once again that this is not really the general solution, because there are also other solutions
connected with imaginary ω and k. However, this is the general solution if we restrict
ourselves to the solutions which are consistent with Axioms 5 and 6. A more general solution
would lead to different physical results. In particular, fields would not commute for spacelike
separations.
There is one more important property of the operator φˆ(x, t) and its corresponding Hilbert
space. For any fixed instant t = t0 and for any regular function φ(x), there is a Hilbert state
|ψ〉 such that
φˆ(x, t)|ψ〉 = φ(x)|ψ〉 , for t = t0 . (15)
A similar statement is true for the operator pˆi(x, t). However, similar statements are not
true if the roles of time coordinate and one of the space coordinates are exchanged.
This fact leads to an important additional physical motivation for Axiom 5. This ax-
iom essentialy says that singular field configurations can never form in a proper classical
theory. We know very well that Einstein’s theory of gravity does not possess this property,
because it leads to cosmological and black-hole-like singularities. Almost everyone agrees
that singularities do not really exist in the real world. However, there is a wide belief that
quantum theory of gravity, when found one day, could remove such pathologies, even if the
corresponding classical theory does possess these patologies. I want to argue that quantum
physics cannot remove, in a satisfactory way, the singularities of the corresponding classical
theory; we should rather modify the theory of gravity for strong fields already at the classical
level.
For this reason, I consider a simple example: a particle moving in a spherically symmetric
potential V (r), such that V (∞) = 0 and V (0) = −∞. Classically, the particle can fall into
the potential well, thus reaching infinite kinetic energy (but finite total energy, which is the
constant of the motion and is the sum of the kinetic and the potential energy). It is often said
that quantum physics prevents such pathological behavior because it prevents the particle
falling into the center of the potential well. But is this really true? The Schro¨dinger equation
gives a set of eigenfunctions of the Hamiltonian {Ψn(x; t) = ψn(x)e−iEnt}, which serves as
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a base for the general solution of the Schro¨dinger equation. This means that the particle
can be found everywhere, including the singular point r = 0. The set of functions {ψn(x)}
is complete, which means, in particular, that the wave function at some particular instant
can be proportional to δD−1(x), or to eip·x for any particular p, which are eigenstates of the
operators xˆ and pˆ, respectively. In other words, the particle can attain any position or any
momentum. The only restriction is that these two quantities are not mutually independent,
because the corresponding operators do not commute. In the language of energy, the particle
can possess any mean potential energy or any mean kinetic energy, including the infinite one.
The only restriction is that it cannot possess a mean total energy smaller than the ground-
state energy E0. And this is not a much better situation than in classical physics, because
in a typical physical classical situation we do not expect a minus infinite total energy either.
However, why is an atom still stable? This is because the probability density for states
with a fixed energy Pn(x) = |ψn(x)|2 does not depend on time, so lasts forever. On the other
hand, if the wave function is proportional, for example, to δD−1(x) at some instant t, then it
is a state which possesses components of many admissible energies. Thus P (x) changes with
time, being strictly localized only at one particular instant t. Thus we have much better
chances to find the particle in a state with a fixed energy.
Similarly, if the classical theory of gravity possesses a singular solution gµν(x) for some
instant t, then we must expect that in the corresponding quantum theory there exists a
state |ψ〉 which corresponds to this solution at some instant t. The best we can expect is
that we shall never observe such a state because it lasts too short. However, I believe that
singular states should not exist at all, so I require that singularities should not appear even
in classical physics.
Now we are finally ready to propose an axiom for the quantization of fields. It must
explain, rather than postulate, why time has a special role in quantization and why in (14)
we take only real ω and k. We do not know how to canonically quantize theories with higher
than second derivatives in the equations of motion, but it seems that such theories cannot
be consistent with Axiom 5, as I discuss in Section 6. Thus we assume that all fields that
can be arbitrarily chosen (except that they must be essentially regular and ordered) onMB,
can be divided into a set of fields {ϕa} and conjugate momentum fields {pia}, where
pia =
∂L
∂(∂tϕa)
(16)
and t is the coordinate defined as in Section 4. Having all this in mind, I propose:
Axiom 8 Let x,x′ ∈MB. All fields {ϕa} and {pia} are quantized in such a way that
[ϕˆa(x, 0), pˆib(x
′, 0)]± = iδabδ
D−1(x− x′) ,
[ϕˆa(x, 0), ϕˆb(x
′, 0)]± = [pˆia(x, 0), pˆib(x
′, 0)]± = 0 . (17)
Furthermore, the field operators {ϕˆa(x)} and {pˆia(x)} satisfy classical equations of motion
and they are quantized in such a way that for given functions ϕa(x) and pia(x) there exist
states |ψϕa〉 and |ψpia〉 such that
ϕˆa(x, 0)|ψϕa〉 = ϕa(x)|ψϕa〉 ,
pˆia(x, 0)|ψpia〉 = pia(x)|ψpia〉 , (18)
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if and only if ϕa(x) and pia(x) are essentially regular functions.
It is, of course, understood that we use anticommutators if both fields possess half-integer
spin and commutators otherwise. For fermion degrees, ϕa(x) and pia(x) are products of a
complex essentially regular function and a Grassmann number. Since this quantization is
canonical, it is not manifestly covariant. However, we expect that covariance is preserved
because the field operators satisfy the covariant equations of motion. This can be explicitly
proved for free fields and on the perturbative level for fields in interaction, but I shall
not consider these rather technical problems. One of the most important consequences
of covariance is that the statements of Axiom 8 are valid not only for t = 0, but also for all
other times, obtained by time evolution or coordinate transformation.
Axiom 8 can be understood as an initial condition for the field operators. It proposes
that we have to quantize those classical variables which can be arbitrarily chosen on MB.
It can also be viewed as an explanation why in the quantum theory of particles (i.e., first
quantization) there is an xˆ-operator, but there is no tˆ-operator.
An important ingredient of Axiom 8 is that it proposes that only physical degrees of
freedom should be quantized. This is extremely important for quantum gravity, because the
quantum theory of gravity in which both physical and nonphysical degrees are quantized is
not equivalent to the theory in which only physical degrees are quantized. The quantization
of the physical degrees only is also one of the ways how to solve the problem of time in
quantum gravity [14].
It is also important to note that the consistency of the canonical quantization requires
the topology of spacetime to be Σ×R, which is provided by Axiom 1.
It is straightforward to convert operators and states from the Heisenberg to the Schro¨dinger
picture. This leads to the functional Schro¨dinger equation, which determines the wave func-
tional Ψ[φ(x); t), being a functional with respect to φ(x) and a function with respect to t.
Both the Heisenberg and the Schro¨dinger picture of quantum field theory manifestly express
the fact that space and time are not treated in the same way. On the other hand, it is usually
stated that the functional-integral formulation is manifestly covariant, which might seem to
be in contradiction with the fact that space and time have different roles in quantization.
However, space and time have different roles even in the functional-integral formulation,
because it is given by
〈φf(x), tf |φi(x), ti〉 =
∫
[dφ(x, t)][dpi(x, t)]×
exp
{
i
∫ tf
ti
dt
∫
dD−1x
[
pi(x, t)φ˙(x, t)−H (φ(x, t),∇φ(x, t), pi(x, t))
]}
, (19)
where |φ(x), t〉 ≡ Ψ[φ(x); t). The left-hand side obviously gives different roles to space and
time. This is manifested on the right-hand side in the fact that the functional integral is not
performed over all functions φ(x, t), but only over functions which satisfy
φ(x, tf) = φf(x) , φ(x, ti) = φi(x) . (20)
Furthermore, t takes values from the finite interval t ∈ [ti, tf ], while x takes values from the
infinite interval x ∈ RD−1. At the end, the subintegral function piφ˙ − H(φ,∇φ, pi) is not
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Lorentz invariant. The invariant form is obtained only when the pi-dependence is integrated
out, the vacuum-to-vacuum amplitude is considered, and ti → −∞, tf →∞;
〈φf(x) = 0, tf →∞|φi(x) = 0, ti → −∞〉 ≡ Z =
∫
[dφ(x)] exp
{
i
∫
dDx L(φ(x), ∂µφ(x))
}
.
(21)
However, the left-hand side still treats space and time in different ways and the functional
integral on the right-hand side is still restricted to functions which satisfy (20). The gen-
eral expression (19) is equivalent to the Schro¨dinger equation, while the Lorentz-invariant
expression (21) is only a special case, from which the Schro¨dinger equation cannot be derived.
It is also important to note that in (19), for a given space-time point (x, t 6= ti, tf),
the integration is performed over all possible finite real values of φ and pi. This is the
direct consequence of the fact that for any regular functions φ(x), pi(x) and for any t there
exist states such that these functions are eigen-values of the corresponding field operators.
This means that in theories with constraints the functional integral is performed only over
the physical degrees of freedom, which is important for quantum gravity. Note also that,
according to my axioms, in the case of quantum gravity there is no sum over topologies; only
the global RD topology is included.
Let us now discuss the meaning of the discussion presented in Section 4 from the point
of view of quantum field theory. Although the whole Section 4 refers to the classical field
theory, all arguments are correct at the macroscopic level, because we know that classical
theory is a good approximation at the macroscopic level. In particular, the law of disorder
increasing, as a statistical law, is valid only on the macroscopic level. On the other hand,
there are arguments that quantum mechanics possesses the intrinsic, fundamental time ar-
row, connected with the “fact” that wave functions collapse. However, excelent arguments
against such conclusions are given in [15]. There are also arguments, based on the consider-
ations of the wave function of the Universe, that entropy would start to decrease when the
Universe starts to contract. It is remarkable to note that Hawking was the first that came to
such a conclusion [16], but later he corrected himself [6], claiming that his conclusions were
based on certain misinterpretations. A general discussion on various misunderstandings of
the time arrow is given in [17]. It seems to me that all conclusions made by some authors
about the different status of the time arrow in classical and quantum physics, if not incorrect,
are at least interpretation dependent, because there are various interpretations of quantum
mechanics and no one knows yet which is the correct one. The origin of the collapse of the
wave function is still not understood. My personal belief is that quantum mechanics is just
some effective, incomplete theory, while the underlying more fundamental theory is some
deterministic nonlocal hidden variable theory, which obeys some laws not very different from
the axioms of Section 3. Actually, it is very likely that only Axiom 3 should be modified. For
example, in the de Broglie–Bohm interpretation of quantum field theory [18], the classical
equations of motion are modified by adding an external force proportional to h¯2, in which
fields are integrated over space, but not over time. This term breakes Lorentz covariance
and locality, but the resulting theory still possesses a well-posed initial-value problem. In
this interpretation, Lorentz covariance and locality are statistical effects, which are the only
one measured in present experiments.
Having in mind the remarks of the last paragraph, we may conclude that quantum
mechanics probably does not change the origin of the time arrow.
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6 Do our theories satisfy Axiom 5?
We have argued that equations of motion must obey some properties, such as hyperbolicity
and boundedness of energy from below, in order to satisfy Axiom 5. However, nothing
provides that these properties are enough. We have to check whether our theories really
satisfy this axiom, and if they do not, whether they can be modified in such a way as to
still agree with present observations. I give only some qualitative discussion of this, without
intention to be rigorous.
Let us start from the electrodynamics. Electromagnetic fields and charges obey Lenz’s
law, which essentially states that any change tends to be canceled. This speaks in favor
of satisfying Axiom 5. One could argue that classical electrodynamics has problems with
infinities connected with pointlike charges. However, one should not forget that we are
considering a field theory of charges, i.e., continuous distributions of charge. Because of
Axiom 6, there are no initial infinite charge densities and thus there are no initial pointlike
charges. Since the force among charges of the same sign is repulsive, pointlike charges will
never form. Of course, both classical and quantum electrodynamics still cannot determine
the size of the electron and its electromagnetic mass. But the important thing is that classical
electrodynamics does not predict the singularities of this kind.
However, it seems that classical electrodynamics can still lead to some divergences under
very specific initial conditions. For example, one can consider a free electromagnetic wave
which is exactly spherically symmetric and moves toward the center of the sphere. This will
result with an infinite energy-density in the center when the wave comes there. However,
the Lagrangian of the electrodynamics is certainly not correct for very strong fields, so it
is very likely that formation of such infinities is prevented on high energy scales, by some
yet unknown interactions. Similar discussion can be done for all other nongravitational
interactions.
The inconsistency of Einstein’s theory of gravity with Axiom 5 is more obvious than that
of other theories, because it is shown by Hawking and Penrose [19] that singularities will
develop under very general initial conditions in Einstein’s classical theory of gravity. This is
one of the motivations to find an alternative theory of gravitation. The status of singularities
in various alternative theories of gravitation is reviewed in [20].
One class of alternative gravity theories are higher derivative theories, based on addition
of higher powers of the curvature tensor to the Lagrangian of Einstein’s theory. However, even
if these terms can prevent cosmological and black-hole-like singularities, their unconsistency
with Axiom 5 is even more obvious. It appears [21] that in such theories the energy is
not bounded from below and thus runaway solutions appear. Similar problems appear in
various nongravitational higher derivative theories as well. There is no general theorem which
provides that every higher derivative partial differential equation possesses such problems,
but such problems are found in physically interesting cases. This is why we usually disregard
higher derivative theories. It is also often claimed that such theories violate causality. This is
because one needs to impose the boundary conditions at t→ ±∞ in order to remove these
runaway solutions. The presence of runaway solutions is also connected to the violation
of Einstein causality, i.e., to nonvanishing (anti)commutators outside the light-cone. This
connection can be easily seen on the example of tachyon fields [7].
Another class of generalizations of Einstein’s theory of gravitation are gauge theories of
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gravity [1], [22]. The most important of them is the Einstein-Cartan theory, which leads
to the existence of torsion. It appears that singularities in such theories do not develop
under such wide conditions as in Einstein’s theory, but they can still appear, for example,
for spinless matter, which does not feel torsion.
The third class of alternative gravity theories, perhaps most in the spirit of the philosophy
of this article, are bi-metric theories. The main idea is to separate the metric tensor in two
parts
gµν = γµν + Φµν , (22)
where γµν is a nondynamical, background metric, while Φµν is a dynamical field, determined
by some differential equations. Such theories are often called “field theories of gravitation”
because such theories are the most similar to other field theories, describing a field in a fixed
background metric. In theories of this kind it is manifest that topology is not dynamical,
but rather fixed by the background metric γµν .
One of the variants of bi-metric theories which seems to be a good candidate to be
a better theory of gravitation, is the theory developed by Logunov and others [23]. The
motivation for this theory has been criticized [24] because this theory was motivated by
some incorrect criticism of Einstein’s theory of gravity. However, Logunov’s theory itself is
self-consistent and still possesses some advantages with respect to Einstein’s theory. The
background metric in this theory is flat Minkowski metric γµν = ηµν . The metric gµν of a
spherically symmetric object with a massM takes the same form as a Schwarzschild solution
for r ≫ 2MG. However, a small mass m is attributed to the gravitational field Φµν , whose
effect is that the gravitational force becomes repulsive for strong fields, thus preventing
black-hole and cosmological singularities.1 A homogeneous and isotropic universe is infinite
in space, exists for an infinitely long time and oscillates. Thus it seems that this theory
satisfies Axiom 5 and is manifestly in agreement with Axiom 1. However, I am far from
saying that this is the right theory. For example, the corresponding quantum variant is
certainly not renormalizable, essentially for the same reasons as Einstein’s theory, because
the same dimensional coupling constant G appears in the Lagrangian. I am just arguing
that this theory could be closer to the right theory which we do not know yet.
Let us discuss at the end why there are no fields with spin higher than 2. Their status is
similar to the theories with derivatives higher than second; there is no general theorem, but
the simplest theories constructed, for example, in [27] possess some pathologies. They violate
Einstein causality, i.e., they propagate faster than light and (anti)commutators do not vanish
outside the light-cone. They also violate Cauchy causality, i.e., the Cauchy problem is not
well posed. The axioms of Section 3 assume, of course, that the Cauchy problem must be
well posed. The general relation between Einstein and Cauchy causality is discussed in [28].
1There are arguments that even a small mass cannot be attributed to a graviton because it would signif-
icantly deviate from experiments even in a small mass limit [25]. However, these arguments are applicable
only to Einstein’s theory of gravity, not to any theory of gravity. The effects of a small enough graviton
mass in Logunov’s theory are in agreement with experiments [26].
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7 Discussion
As discussed already, only Axioms 1 and 5 are really novel principles, in the sense that they
differ from the conventional point of view and can be tested, at least in principle. Here I
want to discuss whether these axioms can be rejected or weakened and what consequences
of this would be. I shall also give a few comments on the dimensionality of space.
Axiom 5 essentially says that for any finite everywhere initial condition the solution is
also finite everywhere. This axiom explains the hyperbolicity, i.e., the (1, D − 1) signature
of the metric. It also explains the absence of tachyons, the positivity of energy, and other
related properties of nature. However, from these properties Axiom 5 certainly cannot be
derived.
First, there is a possibility that infinities do exist, but almost no one believes that.
A much more probable possibility is that nature somehow chooses only those initial
conditions that will not lead to infinities. However, such a principle is quite unaestetical;
Axiom 6 seems much simpler and more natural than this one.
The best alternative is probably the assumption that singularities can occur in classical
physics as long as quantum physics prevents them. However, as we have already discussed,
quantum physics cannot prevent the existence of states which correspond to the singular
behavior at some particular instant of time. The best we can expect from quantum physics
is that it is practically impossible to observe such states. One can be satisfied with this, but
Axiom 5, together with Axiom 8, is more satisfying, because it provides that singular states
do not exist at all.
It is difficult to test Axiom 5 experimentally, because we cannot measure infinities. How-
ever, finding tachyons, for example, would be a strong argument against this axiom. But
this would also violate some widely accepted principles, such as Einstein causality.
A more serious question is whether the topology is really an nondynamical entity, as
proposed in Axiom 1. I want to emphasize once again that the topology is a more funda-
mental concept than the metric tensor, in the sense that the former can be defined without
the latter. And the Einstein equation is manifestly a theory of the metric tensor, not of the
topology. If the Einstein equation is treated as a Cauchy problem, for example, by numerical
computation, the manifold of space-time points and its topology must be defined before any
computation of the metric tensor is performed. If the Cauchy problem is well posed, then the
space topology cannot change during the time evolution [29]. The fact that some solutions
of the Einstein equation correspond to some topologies still does not mean that the Einstein
equation describes the topology; it merely means that the solution must be consistent with a
given topology. Moreover, the metric tensor even does not uniquely determine the topology.
For example, the flat metric ηµν does not necessarily imply that the corresponding manifold
is infinite; it can also correspond to a torus or a cilinder. A similar statement is true for any
other differential equation; if the solution φ(x) satisfies some periodicity conditions, we still
do not know whether this solution corresponds to a closed or an infinite manifold (i.e., set
of points {x}). If the Einstein equation can say anything at all about the topology, it can
do that only indirectly. At least, this is so in classical gravity. Can quantum gravity change
this? The set of space-time points and its topology is certainly a nondynamical entity in all
nongravitational theories, both classical and quantum. We just argued that this is also so in
classical gravity. So I really do not see why quantum gravity would change this, at least if
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quantum gravity is based on the quantization of some classical theory of the metric tensor,
such as Einstein’s theory. This can be seen most explicitly in the Heisenberg picture; one
writes the general solution of classical equations consistent with a given topology and then
just promotes all free parameters to the operators (assuming that one can solve technical
problems connected with this). This can also be seen from the kinematics of the wave func-
tion Ψ[gµν(x); t); since it is a functional of gµν(x), it can be defined only if the set of points
{x} is previously well defined. However, even if one proposes that various topologies must be
allowed in quantum theory, for example, by summing over topologies in a functional integral
(although it is not clear what would then stay on the left-hand side of the analog of (19)
and what the analog of the condition (20) would be), then one would expect that the sum
over various signatures, or even dimensionalities of spacetime should be performed as well,
because the Einstein equation itself does not fix them either. However, for some reason, such
a possibility is not usually considered. The sum over dimensionalities in quantum gravity
would imply that even in nongravitational quantum theories the sum over dimensionalities
should be performed.
If the topology must be fixed, as I just argued, the next question is what is the topology of
the Universe? In order to Cauchy problem be well posed and canonical quantization possible,
it is necessary that the topology is of the form Σ×R. There are no inconsistencies (as far as
I know) for any choice of a connected, orientable (D− 1)-dimensional manifold Σ without a
boundary. Closed Σ’s would still allow only oscilatory solutions, such as eik·x, no longer by
the finiteness requirement, but rather by the periodicity requirement. However, the choice
Σ = RD−1 is the simplest, the most aesthetical, and leads to the highest degree of symmetry
between space and time. Thus Axiom 1 seems to be very natural. Of course, this axiom still
allows effective closed topologies by an “accident”, if solutions of the equations of motion
satisfy some periodicity conditions. If all fields (and wave functions) satisfy appropriate
periodicity conditions, no observation can distinguish the “really” closed universe from the
periodic one.
At the end, let me make a few comments on the dimensionality of space. The axioms of
this article certainly cannot explain why space is 3-dimensional. The answer to this question
should be searched elsewhere. For example, superstring theory predicts that D = 10. It
still cannot explain why 6 coordinates are compactified. But if they are, this is not in
contradiction with Axiom 1, as I just discussed. Some types of effective compactifications,
such as torus T 6, are still possible.
There are interesting attempts to explain why space is 3-dimensional based on certain
anthropic considerations [4]. However, such arguments do not seem too convincing to me.
8 Conclusion
All differences between the role of space and time in nature can be explained by proposing
a set of principles in which none of the space-time coordinates has an a priori special role.
The essence of my approach is a proposal that all dynamical field equations must be treated
as a Cauchy problem. This requires that the topology of spacetime must be fixed at the
predynamical level. Various choices of topology of the form Σ ×R are admissible, but the
choice RD is the most natural and is the only one that does not give an a priori special
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role to any coordinate. The hyperbolicity, i.e., (1, D − 1) signature of the metric, can be
explained by proposing that any boundary condition that is finite everywhere must lead to
the solution which is also finite everywhere. It also explains the boundedness of energy from
below, the absence of tachyons, and other related properties of nature. It is quite likely that
this principle must be realized in nature because it automatically prevents all kind of physical
singularities. The time arrow can be explained by proposing that the boundary condition is
ordered, rather than random. The quantization can be considered as a boundary condition
for the field operators. It appears natural to quantize the physical degrees of freedom only.
This, together with the treatment of spacetime as a nondynamical background, resolves a
lot of conceptual problems in classical and quantum gravity, including the problem of time
in quantum gravity.
It was no intention of this article to be mathematically rigorous. The main intention
was to provide a complete conceptual understanding. A more rigorous treatment, as well as
many technical details of some questions considered here, can be found in references cited. I
hope that future investigations will also put all other ideas of this article into a more rigorous
framework.
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